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A PROPOSAL FOR APPORTIONING 
DAMAGES IN FAIR 
REPRESENTATION SUITS 
Unions enjoy exclusive control over both negotiations and 
grievance proceedings.1 To protect employees from possible 
union abuse, the United States Supreme Court created the duty 
of fair representation, which requires that a union's statutory 
authority as exclusive bargaining representative be exercised 
fairly and without discrimination.l11 In the typical contract ad-
1 Congress, in enacting federal labor laws, intended to achieve industrial peace by fa-
cilitating collective bargaining. See National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 
(1976) [hereinafter cited as NLRA]. See also Railway Labor Act § 2, 45 U.S.C. § 152 
(1976) [hereinafter cited as RLA]. Congress believed that production uninterrupted by 
strikes and lockouts was best promoted by the settlement of industrial disputes through 
negotiations between the employer and employee representatives. To ensure the effi-
ciency of such negotiations, federal labor laws make a properly chosen union the exclu-
sive representative for collective bargaining. The NLRA, for example, provides in part: 
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, 
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the 
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em-
ployment, or other conditions of employment. 
NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). See also RLA, § 2 (para. 4), 45 U.S.C. § 152 
(para. 4) (1976). Although these sections do not provide for a similar degree of control 
over grievance procedures, see NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976), most collective 
bargaining agreements provide that the union has exclusive control over grievance 
processing. See Lehmann, The Union's Duty of Fair Representation-Steele and Its 
Successors, 30 FED. B.J. 280, 282 (1971); 
• The duty of fair representation was first recognized in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 
323 U.S. 192 (1944). The question presented there was whether an all-white union, certi-
fied under the RLA, could enter into a collective bargaining agreement which favored its 
members over black members in the bargaining unit. Black members attacked these ra-
cially restrictive covenants on constitutional grounds. Since the union derived its author-
ity from the RLA, state action was present. To avoid the constitutional issue, the Court 
created the duty of fair representation which it analogized to the equal protection clause: 
We think the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the statutory representative of 
a craft at least as exacting a duty to protect equally the interests of the members 
of the craft as the constitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal protec-
tion to the interest of those who it legislates. 
Id. at 202. According to the Court, this duty had to be exercised in the interest of and on 
behalf of everyone represented by the union, without hostile discrimination, fairly, im-
partially, and in good faith. The doctrine has steadily expanded since Steele. In Ford 
Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953), the Supreme Court held that the duty was 
not limited to cases arising under the RLA but was equally applicable to cases arising 
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ministration dispute, an aggrieved employee will generally sue 
both the employer for the initial breach of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, and the union for a subsequent breach of the 
duty of fair representation in failing to process the grievance ad-
equately. If the court determines that both parties are indeed 
liable, the remedy question becomes central, requiring the court 
to demarcate the causal connections among the union's breach, 
the employer's breach, and the employee's injury. 
Apportionment of damages in fair representation suits repre-
sents one of the most unsettled issues in labor law today. Al-
though the Supreme Court has attempted to establish a single 
"governing principle" for apportioning damages, lower courts 
have read this principle as authorizing two divergent standards 
for apportionments. 8 Part I of this article traces the evolution 
from the Court's original standard presented in Vaca v. Sipes' 
through two subsequent applications of that standard: the Czo-
sek v. O'Mara1 standard, which interpreted Vaca as placing the 
bulk of damages on the employer, and Justice Stewart's stan-
dard taken from his concurrence in Hines v. Anchor Motor 
Freight,6 which interpreted Vaca as placing most of the damages 
on the union. Part II assesses the adequacy of these two inter-
pretive standards, with criticisms aimed at both of them. Fi-
nally, part III proposes a two-tiered analysis for apportioning 
damages in fair representation suits which synthesizes elements 
of the Czosek and Justice Stewart standards. The implementa-
tion of this article's two-tiered analysis would establish a work-
able apportionment standard consistent with Supreme Court 
pronouncements. As a result of such an implementation, a sig-
nificant degree of predictability could be achieved in this com-
plex area. 
I. THE EVOLUTION FROM Vaca v. Sipes TO DuAL 
APPORTIONMENT STANDARDS FOR FAIR REPRESENTATION CASES 
Vaca v. Sipes,7 the landmark case in the duty of fair represen-
under the NLRA. Although the contours of the duty are still in a state of flux, it is well-
established that it encompasses all phases of union security and activity under federal 
labor law in the negotiatjon and administration of rights under the collective bargaining 
agreement. See Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151, 152 (1957). 
• See notes 43-44 and accompanying text infra. 
• 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
• 397 U.S. 25 (1970). 
• 424 U.S. 554 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
' 386 U.S. 171 (1967). 
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tation area, established two standards: one defining the scope of 
the duty itself, and the second apportioning damages after the 
breach had been proven. In terms of the standard for breach of 
the duty, the Supreme Court in Vaca held that no breach of the 
duty of fair representation exists without proof that the union 
acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith.8 Lower courts 
have seized upon the words "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad 
faith" as the governing standard for breaches, but have dis-
agreed about the words' true meanings.8 The trend, however, 
seems to be moving from a bad faith approach toward a more 
easily breached negligence standard. Io Under the latter stan-
dard, courts have found unions in breach of the duty for missing 
grievance filing deadlines, 11 failing to investigate arbitration 
cases fullylll and failing to notify the grievant that his or her 
claim has been dropped.Ia Most commentators agree that a neg-
ligence standard will increase the likelihood that employees will 
bring fair representation suits against their unions. 14 Because 
• Id. at 190. Vaca involved an employee who had been permanently discharged from 
his job in a meatpacking plant becauae of high blood pressure. The employee filed a 
grievance with the union, which processed it up to arbitration but declined to process it 
into arbitration after a neutral physician concurred with the judgment of company doc-
tors. The employee sued the employer for breach of contract, and sued the union for 
breach of the duty of fair representation in not processing the grievance into arbitration. 
Although the Court took this opportunity to analyze the duty of fair representation in 
depth, it concluded that in the instant case the union had not breached its duty. 
• Compare Cooper v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 416 F. Supp. 13, 17 (S.D. Ind. 1976) 
(some evidence of fraud, deceit, or dishonest conduct must be shown or there is no 
breach of duty of fair representation), and Papillon v. Hughes Printing Co., 413 F. Supp. 
1313, 1317 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (there must be substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action, 
or dishonest union conduct to show that the duty of fair representation has been 
breached), with De Arroyo v. Sindicato.De Trabajadores Packinghouae, AFL-CIO, 425 
F.2d 281, 284 (1st Cir.) (meritorious grievance may not be ignored by union nor 
processed perfunctorily, although due care not yet part of union's duty), cert. denied., 
400 U.S. 877 (1970), and Ruggirello v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F. Supp. 758, 760 (E. D. 
Mich. 1976) (union that fails to process a grievance without determining its merits 
breaches the duty of fair representation despite lack of had faith). 
•• See Note, Determining Standards for a Union's Duty of Fair Representation: The 
Case for Ordinary Negligence, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 634 (1980). 
11 Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 310-11 (6th Cir. 1975) (Court noted 
that "such negligent handling of the grievance unrelated as it was to the merits of [the] 
case, amounts to unfair representation. It is a clear example of arbitrary and perfunctory 
handling of a grievance."). 
•• Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 561 (1976) (union's failure to investi-
gate the innocence claim of its discharged members breached the duty of fair 
representation). 
11 Minnis v. UAW, 531 F.2d 850, 854 (8th Cir. 1975) (employee's claim should not 
have been subject to summary judgment since the union had accepted his grievance yet 
inexplicably failed to represent him, and failed to notify him that it had dropped his 
grievance). 
,. See Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: 
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more cases will be brought, a clear standard delimiting liability 
is needed. 
A: The Vaca v. Sipes Apportionment Standard 
. Once a court establishes that the employer breached its con-
tract and that the union subsequently breached the duty of fair 
representation, the second standard announced in Vaca comes 
into play. In analyzing the proble~ of damage apportionment, 
the Vaca Court focused on the relative harms caused to the em-
ployees by the different parties' actions.11 The Court, while rec-
ognizing that the appropriate remedy for breach of a union's 
duty of fair representation should vary with the circumstances 
of the particular breach, 18 laid down a standard to be applied in 
all fair representation cases: liability for damages resulting from 
· breaches of. the duty should be apportioned in relation to the 
respective fault of the union and employer.17 The Court thus re-
What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. RBv. 251, 278 (1977); Tobias, A 
Plea for the Wrongfully Discharged Employee Abandoned by His Union, 41 U. CIN. L. 
RBv. 55, 74-76 (1972). . . 
16 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). The early fair representation cases centered on 
the breach of the duty at the bargaining table. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 
U.S. 192 (1944); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953): The courts, therefore, 
focused their attention on the union's conduct in negotiating the contract. Generally the 
union's wrongful conduct was not tied to any breach of contract by the employer. Conse-
quently, demands for compensation were restricted to unions, and the relief sought 
against employers was an injunction against implementation of the agreement. See Lin-
sey, The Apportionment of Liability for Damages Between Employer and Union in 
§ 301 Actions Involving a Union's Breach of Its Duty of Fair Representation, 30 MER-
CER L. R.Bv. 661, 664 (1979). When the duty was extended from the bargaining table to 
contract administration, apportionment problems emerged. The dynamics of a fair repre-
sentation suit at the collective bargaining table are completely different than the dynam-
ics in contract administration. An employee can sue his employer for breach of the col-
lective bargaining agreement under § 301 of the Labor Management Reporting Act. 29 
U.S.C. § 185 (1976). But since most collective agreements provide that the union has the 
sole right to file grievances, the employee has to show that the union breached its duty of 
fair representation to avoid a defense of failure to exhaust contractual remedies. See 
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). The union's breach of duty in this 
setting is seen not only as an independent source of liability, but as a vehicle to prevent 
breaching employers from hiding behind union wrongs. See Vaca v .. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 
186 (1967). Prayers for relief in these suits, therefore, are generally for damages against 
both the union and the employer. Courts initially faced with this problem applied tort 
damage principles and assessed joint liability. See Cunningham v. Erie R.R., 358 F.2d 
640 (2d Cir. 1966). 
11 386 U.S. at 195. , 
17 The Court said: 
The governing principle, then, is to apportion liability between the employer 
and the union according to the damages caused by the fault of each. Thus, dam-
ages attributable solely to the employer's breach of contract should not be 
charged to the union, but increases if any in those damages caused by the 
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jected the view of fair representation damages as indivisible. 
The Court, however, did not clarify the meaning behind the 
term "fault of the parties." 
An indication of what the Court meant, nonetheless, can be 
gained from its application of this standard in Vaca. In Vaca, an 
employee alleged that he had been discharged in violation of the 
collective bargaining agreement. The employee further charged 
that the• union had "arbitrarily, capriciously and without just 
. . . cause" refused to take his grievance to arbitration.18 The 
company was not a party to the suit.1• The union alone appealed 
the lower court's award of damages against it, including contrac-
tual back pay. The Supreme Court ruled that damages flowing 
from the employer's breach of contract could not be assessed 
against the union.10 The Court reasoned that although the union 
had violated a statutory duty in failing to press the grievance, 
the employer's unrelated breach of contract actually triggered 
the controversy causing the lost wages that the employee sought 
from the union.11 The Court then stated that although damages 
attributable solely to the employer's breach of contract should 
not be charged to the union, increases if any in these damages 
caused by the union's refusal to process the grievance should not 
be charged to the employer.11 Applying that standard to the 
facts of the case, the Court stated that even if the union had 
breached its duty, all or almost all of the employee's damages 
would still be attributable to the employer's discharge. The 
Court, consequently, held the damage award improper.18 
Read in light of its holding Vaca indicates that an employer 
will be held liable for the bulk of the damages in fair representa-
tion suit. The union, on the other hand, will only be liable for 
the increases in those damages. u 
union's refusal to process the grievance should not be charged to the employer. 
Id. at 197-98. The Court, in dictum, did recognize one instance where an apportionment 
on the basis of fault was not necessary. The Court said that in the event of union collu-
sion with the company or wrongful inducement of the discharge by the union, or to the 
extent the union's conduct clearly made it more difficult for the employee to remedy the 
company's breach, joint and several liability wouicf be appropriate. Id. ~t 197 n.18. 
••Id.at 173." 
•• Id. at 176 n.4. The company was defending a separate action, which was pending 
below at the pretrial stage. ·· 
to Id. at 196-97. 
11 Id. at 197. 
11 Id. at 197-98. 
11 Id. 
14 See Tobias, supra note 16, at 76: 
The Court in Vaca held that the company, rather than the union, usually should 
be responsible for most of the loss of employment damages suff'ered by the 
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B. The Czosek Standard: Refining Vaca 
Although Vaca laid down the governing principle for appor-
tioning damages in fair representation suits, the parameters of 
that principle remained largely undefined. In particular, confu-
sion enshrouded the Court's cryptic statement about the union's 
liability for "increases" in the damages. 
The Court clarified this ambiguity in Czosek v. O'Mara,H a 
case arising under the Railway Labor Act. In Czosek, former em-
ployees of the Delaware Lackawanna Railroad claimed they had 
been replaced in violation of a merger agreement. The union al-
legedly remained hostile to the claim throughout, and gave no 
indication that it would protect the employees' interests. The 
employees failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by not 
appealing to the Railroad Adjustment Board; therefore, their 
complaint against the employer was dismissed.28 The court of 
appeals, however, upheld the claim against the union for breach 
of the duty of fair representation. 27 
In reviewing the union's claim that it should not have been 
sued alone because the breach had its roots in the employer's 
improper discharge, the Supreme Court clarified the Vaca prin-
ciple by adopting a "bright line" standard for apportionment of 
damages in fair representation suits. Under the ·Czosek rule, the 
employer's liability covers those damages related to "loss of em-
ployment", i.e., contractual backpay and benefits. The union's 
liability extends only to the "added" expenses the employee ex-
pends in "collecting from the employer," i.e., attorney fees and 
court costs.28 Clearly, the Court viewed the employer's breach of 
plaintiff. It reasoned that since the company caused and triggered the wrongful 
discharge, the union should only be liable in the event of union collusion with 
the company or wrongful inducement of the discharge by the union, or to the 
extent the union's conduct clearly made it more difficult for the employee to 
remedy the company's breach. Thus the principal target in most wrongful dis-
charge suits is the company and not the union. [footnote omitted]. 
u 397 U.S. 25 (1970). 
" See O'Mara v. Erie L.R.R., 407 F.2d 674, 677-78 (2d Cir. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Czo-
sek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970). The railroad industry is unique because an employee 
may present a contractual claim for lost wages against an employer to the Railroad Ad-
justment Board without union aid or approval. RLA § 3(i), 45 U.S.C. § 153(i) (1976). 
17 O'Mara v. Erie L.R.R., 407 F.2d 674, 678 (2d Cir. 1969); aff'd sub nom. Czosek v. 
O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970). 
" The Court stated: 
Assuming a wrongful discharge by the employer independent of any discrimina-
tory conduct by the union and a subsequent discriminatory refusal by the union 
to process grievances based on the discharge, damages against the union for loss 
of employment are unrecoverable except to the extent that its refusal to handle 
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contract as the cause of any wages lost to employees, whereas 
the union's breach of the duty of fair representation only caused 
the legal expenses paid out by the employees to enforce their 
contractual rights. 
The Czosek standard, which holds the employer liable for all 
contractual damages including backpay while holding the union 
liable for all legal fees, makes sense considering the nature of 
collective bargaining agreements. Although the collective bar-
gaining agreement shares a number of characteristics with a con-
ventional contract, most of these similarities are superficial. 
While technically both are agreements between two signatory 
parties, the union is not the obligor of any contractual duty run-
ning to the employees.29 The employer, as the obligor, should 
logically shoulder the costs of any damages flowing from the 
breach of contract. The union's only duty, implied from the stat-
ute80 and existing wholly apart from the contract, 81 is to re-
present the employees fairly without discrimination. 81 The union 
that had fairly represented the employee in the grievance proce-
dure would bear the legal fees with the employee receiving the 
entire amount of the backpay award. In the typical unfair repre-
sentation case, however, the union's breach of duty forces the 
employee to hire outside counsel to sue the employer. Unless 
successful plaintiffs are awarded attorneys fees, they will have to 
pay them out of the backpay award. 88 As a result, plaintiffs 
would not be made whole, and in fact would be worse off than if 
they had been successful in arbitration. 84 Given these features -of 
the grievances added to the difficulty and expense of collecting from the em-
ployer. If both the union and the employer have independ,ently caused damage 
to employees, the union cannot complain if separate actions are brought against 
it and the employer for the portion of the total damages caused by each. 
397 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added). 
19 See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 540 (1976). 
80 See note 2 supra. 
11 That the duty exists outside of the contract is evidenced by its application to the 
bargaining table. If the duty were derived from the contract, there would be no duty in 
this precontract negotiation period. See Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule in Collec-
tive Bargaining, 64 MINN. L. REv. 183, 186-93 (1980). 
u See note 2 and accompanying text supra. 
aa See Tobias, supra note 14, at 84. The author indicates that for a variety of reasons, 
including the plaintiff's lack of funds, the general unwillingness of defendants to settle, 
and the inherent difficulties of the cases, plaintiff's counsel may charge a contingency fee 
of between 33 and 45 percent of any recovery. 
" The theory behind an award of attorney's fees against the union derives from the 
well-established principle that a tortfeasor's liability for compensatory damages includes 
legal fees which proximately result from his wrongful act. See generally 22 AM. JUR. 2d 
DAMAGES § 166 (1965), and Annot., 45 A.L.R. 2d 1183 (1956) (where defendant's tort 
forces plaintiff to litigate against a third party, the plaintiff's legal fees should be treated 
as consequential damages caused by the original wrongful act.) 
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collective bargaining agreements, the Czosek interpretation rep-
resented a much needed clarification of the original Vaca 
standard. 
C. The Justice Stewart Standard 
In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,88 Justice Stewart ar-
rived at an interpretation of Vaca which differs significantly 
from the "bright line" standard established in Czosek.86 The 
Court in Hines held that a contractually binding arbitration de-
cision could be set aside by a showing that an employer had 
breached the contract and that the union had breached the duty 
of fair representation. On the remedy issue, the Court merely 
noted that after an employee had proven a wrongful discharge 
and a breach of the duty of fair representation, he would be en-
titled to an "appropriate remedy against the employer as well as 
the Union."87 The Court, while not explaining the meaning of an 
"appropriate remedy," presumably referred to the apportion-
ment scheme devised in Vaca and refined in Czosek. 
Justice Stewart offered a different interpretation of the Vaca 
apportionment standard. In his concurrence, Stewart said that a 
showing that the union breached its duty of fair representation 
would remove the bar of finality from an arbitration decision. 
Such a showing, however, should not render an employer liable 
for backpay accruing between the time of the "tainted" arbitra-
tion decision and a subsequent "untainted" determination that 
the discharges were after all wrongful. Stewart argued that if an 
employer relies in good faith on a favorable arbitration decision, 
his failure to reinstate a discharged employee cannot be wrong-
ful, until there has been a contrary determination. 86 To Stewart, 
the critical phrase in Vaca - "increases if any in those damages 
caused by the union's refusal to process the grievance should not 
be charged to the employer" - means that the lost wages and 
legal fees incurred after the breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation must be charged to the union.89 Stewart contended that a 
contrary result would leave an employer liable for conduct "pre-
cisely in accord with the dictates of the collective agreement. "'0 
16 424 U.S. 554 (1976). 
11 Id. at 572-73 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
87 Id. at 572. 
11 Id. at 573 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
" Id. (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197-98 (1967)). 
'° 424 U.S. at 573 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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Justice Stewart's placement of liability for lost wages on the 
union is totally inconsistent with the Czosek standard. The orig-
inal Vaca apportionment principle, however, is sufficiently am-
biguous to justify Stewart's interpretation. The Czosek standard 
seeks to separate the damages on the basis of what duty is owed 
to the employee. Because the employer's duty is contractual, the 
Czosek standard places the contractual damages on the em-
ployer. Similarly, because the union's duty is to represent the 
employee, Czosek places the cost of securing outside counsel and 
related expenses on the union. Stewart, on the other hand, does 
not focus upon the type of duty involved. Rather, the Justice 
apportions damages on the basis·of when the union's breach oc-
curred in relation to the employer's breach. Stewart would hold . 
the employer liable for its breach of contract only up to the 
point where the union's exercise of its duty of fair representation 
could have gotten the employee reinstated. This standard would 
place all liability on the union for damages beyond that point, 
because the union's breach of duty can be viewed as an interven-
ing cause. 
Justice Stewart's standard, by focusing on fairness to the em-. 
ployer, facilitates the private settlement of labor disputes. Em-
ployers should be encouraged to use ·private grievance and arbi-
tration procedures because this furthers the goal of achieving 
industrial peace without government intervention. To this end, 
employers should be able to rely on an arbitrator's final determi-
nation of liability even though their original contract breach pre-
ceded the union's breach of duty. If employers cannot rely on 
the grievance and arbitration procedures set up in the collective 
bargaining contract, they will be less likely during contract nego-
tiations to agree to such procedures. This would of course frus-
trate the objective of private settlements. 
II. CRITICISMS OF THE STEWART AND Czosek ST~ARDS 
The Czosek and Stewart standards represent fundamentally 
different views about the purpose of damages in fair representa-
tion suits. Czosek interpreted Vaca to mean that a union may 
not be charged with any damages attributable solely to the em-
ployer's breach of contract, even those arising after the union 
had breached its duty, because to do so would "be a real hard-
ship on the union."'1 Justice Stewart in Hines, on the other 
" Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 197 (1967), cited in Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 29 
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hand, focused on fairness to the employer. To Stewart the 
union's breach of the duty of fair representation should be 
viewed as the cause of any damages which occur after that point. 
In Stewart's view, the union should be held liable for any dam-
ages which occurred after its breach of the duty of fair represen-
tation because those damages cannot be viewed as "solely" flow-
ing from the employer's contract breach, but are perceived more 
properly as "increases . . . in those damages. ""1 As a result, 
Stewart placed all liability for these damages on the union. 
The distinction between Czosek's and Justice Stewart's stan-
dards has important practical consequences. Lower federal 
courts are split as to which standard should apply; consequently 
two lines of cases have emerged, one following Czosek"8 and the 
other applying the Stewart standard." With the battle lines so 
clearly drawn betweeµ placing the bulk of fair representation 
damages on the union or on the employer, courts presented with 
apportionment questions clearly need direction as to which stan-
dard ought to be applied in particular situations. 
A. Problems Plaguing the Justice Stewart Standard 
Justice Stewart's standard, while bolstering .employer confi-
dence in the grievance system, suffers from four major shortcom-
ings: an oftentimes misplaced concern for the breaching em-
ployer; the questionable causal basis underlying his views on 
(1970). 
•• 386 U.S. at 197-8, quoted in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 5{>4, 573 
(1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
•• Segarra v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 581 F.2d 291, 298 (1st Cir. 1978) (Czosek used to 
illustrate that attorney fees were properly awardable against unions in fair representa-
tion suits); Milstead v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 957, 580 F.2d 232, 236-37 
(6th Cir. 1978) (lower court's award of damages overturned because lost wages may have 
been included in damages assessed against the union); Scott v. Local 77, Int'l Bhd. of 
Teamsters, 548 F.2d 1244, 1246 (6th Cir. 1977) (Czosek cited as the proper standard on 
which to apportion damages in remanding for a determination of liability); DeArroyo v. 
Sindicata de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1970) (court used a "but 
for" analysis to illustrate that the union was not liable for contractual damages), cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970) . 
.. Clayton v. ITT Gilfillan, 102 L.R.R.M. 2190 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Hines concur-
rence as the proper interpretation of Vaca); Battle v. Clark Equipment Co., 579 F.2d 
1338, 1350 (7th Cir. 1978) (citing Justice Stewart's concurrence for the generalized prin-
ciple that an employer's liability should only extend to the point of the union's breach of 
duty); Attwood v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 491 (D. Or. 1977) (citing Stewart 
for the proposition that employers are entitled to argue that part of plaintiff's damages 
attributable to the union); Keane v. Eastern Freightways, Inc. 78 Lab. Cas. 20,895 (D. 
N.J. 1976) (relying on Stewart's standard to hold that an employer cannot be held liable 
if it relies on an arbitral award). 
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union liability; his failure to appreciate fully the realities of fair 
representation litigation; and the limited precedential value of 
Stewart's concurrence in Hines, the source of the Stewart 
standard. 
Justice Stewart's concern for the employer seems misplaced in 
cases where the union's breach cannot be represented as bad 
faith misconduct. In Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean Transport 
Co.,n for example, employee Wyatt sued his employer for an on-
the-job injury. After settling the personal injury action, the em-
ployer fired Wyatt on the pretext of his medical unfitness for 
work. Wyatt immediately filed a grievance with his union which, 
after reassurances by the employer that Wyatt was indeed medi-
cally unfit for work, failed to take any further actions. A frus-
trated Wyatt brought suit against the union for a breach of its 
duty of fair representation and against the employer for breach 
of contract. The union's position was that its breach of duty -
not fully investigating the employee's claim - rested upon a 
good faith, though misplaced, reliance on the employer's repre-
sentations about the employee's medical condition, and that the 
employer possessed the full facts surrounding the discharge and 
could have reinstated Wyatt at any time to avoid further dam-
ages. 48 In cases like Wyatt, the employer's wrongful discharge 
and arbitrary conduct may be found to cause the bulk of dam-
ages, and the union's breach plays only a small role in the actual 
damages caused to the employee. The focus, therefore, should be 
on fairness to the union, not fairness to the employer. 
The speculative nature of the damages illuminates a second 
major weakness in the Stewart formulation. His standard suffers 
under the difficulty of actually showing a causal connection be-
tween the union's breach and a subsequent dismissal or adverse 
arbitral holding. In most cases no assurance exists that an arbi-
trator would have found for the employees even if the union had 
fairly represented them. Self v. Drivers Local 61'" illustrates viv-
idly this second weakness of Stewart's standard. In Self, a group 
of employees engaged in a work stoppage unauthorized by the 
union.48 The employer assured the employees that none of them 
'" 439 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Va. 1977), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 623 F.2d 88 (4th Cir. 
1980). 
•• See 439 F. Supp. at 1312. 
" 620 F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1980). 
•• Id. at 442. The plaintiff's were employed by Carolina Freight Carriers Corporation as 
truck drivers. Due to the union's lack of communication, the truck drivers thought they 
were working without a contract when in reality a new one had just gone into effect. The 
drivers began picketing with signs reading "No Contract No Work," and refused to re-
turn to work. 
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would be fired for activities during work stoppage.'9 Despite 
these assurances, the employers discharged the workers but the 
union did not protest. The district court held that this 
amounted to a breach of duty, charging the union for lost 
wages.110 The district court's theory of union liability postulated 
that if the union had protested the dismissal, the . employees 
"might" not have been discharged, or "might have been rein-
stated but for the union's improper action or inaction."111 The 
court of appeals, however, considered this an overly speculative 
basis for the imposition of liability. 112 
In cases like Self, all that can be asserted is what "might or 
might not have been" - a speculatiye determination. Stewart's 
standard would assess liability on this precarious basis. By di-
viding the liability in all cases at the point where the union 
breaches its duty of fair representation, Stewart bases liability 
on the conjecture of what might have been. Considerations of 
fairness to employers are not sufficient to justify this result. 
The Self case also illustrates a third reason why Stewart's 
standard fails: the standard does not recognize the realities of 
fair representation litigation. In the typical case, the union's 
breach of duty will have occurred within a few months of the 
employer's wrongful discharge. Due to the overcrowded condi-
tion of the federal courts, the process of trial and appeal for 
these cases often takes many years.118 In Self, for example, the 
•• Id. The plaintiffs and other drivers returned to work on the understanding that no 
employee would be fined for his participation in the work stoppage. Within a few days, 
however, a large number of drivers received letters from the employer announcing its 
intention to investigate the stoppage and suggesting that disciplinary action might be 
taken against some employees. 
"" Id. at 443. 
a, The court of appeals said: 
The District Court states: But for Local 61's participation, by action and inac-
tion, in breach of its duty of fair representation, plaintiffs might well have not 
even been discharged; but for the breach by Local 61 of its duty to fairly re-
present plaintiffs in the grievance procedure plaintiffs would have had full repre-
sentation and a fair hearing under the applicable procedures before the Bi-State 
Committee and an independent arbitrator, and might well have been restored to 
their jobs and made whole for their losses in the initial grievance proceeding. 
Id. at 443 n.11 (emphasis added). 
oa The court stated: "The union properly does bear responsibility, however, for any 
expense incurred by the plaintiff directly as a result of the failure of the union to press 
their initial grievance against the employer. This resolution comports with authority 
holding a union liable to its members only for damages attributable to its misconduct." 
Id. at 444. 
oa See, e.g., Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 336 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Mich. 1972), 
rev'd, 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975), on remand, 96 L.R.R.M. 2822 (E.D. Mich. 1977), 
appeal docketed, No. 78-1198 (6th Cir. May 22, 1978). Ruzicka is still being appealed 
after eight years in court. 
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litigation commenced in 1970 and was not resolved until 1980. 
The district court determined that lost wages, benefits, and at-
torneys' fees incurred by these employees from the time of the 
duty breach amounted to $600,000.114 Despite the relatively mi-
nor nature of the union's breach, the district court placed all 
these damages on the union.0 Thus, if Stewart's standard ruled, 
employers would be liable only for a few months of lost wages, 
while unions would be liable for the damages accruing during 
the trial and appeal process. This result is obviously unfair in 
most fair representation cases, given the length of time between 
the filing and resolution of the suits in federal court. 
Finally, Stewart's standard has only limited precedential · 
value. Justice Stewart's formulation has never commanded the 
support of a majority of the court. If a majority in Hines had 
been willing to accept Justice Stewart's qualification on the 
damage issue, there would have been no need for him to concur. 
Moreover, Justice White authored all three majority opinions in 
Vaca, Czosek, and Hines. White's Hines opinion does not ad-
dress the damage issue, presumably because he saw no reason to 
disturb his majority holding in Vaca." Stewart's view on dam-
age apportionment did not persuade White to alter the Vaca 
standard, nor did the majority need Stewart's vote. These facts, 
along with the criticisms detailed above, indicate that the inter-
pretation of Vaca in his Hines concurrence belongs uniquely to 
Justice Stewart. 
B. Problems with the Czosek Standard: Deterring Egregious 
Union Misconduct 
The Czosek standard fills most of the gaps apparent in Stew-
art's Hines concurrence by separating the damages according to 
who caused the injury rather than focusing on when the injury 
occurred. By placing the contractual damages on the employer 
and the representation fees on the union, the Czosek standard 
avoids the inequity of saddling the union with the lost backpay 
and benefits that the employee incurs during the trial and ap-
peal process. Finally, Czosek represents the only Supreme Court 
holding on the precise issue of apportionment. As a result of 
... See 620 F.2d at 440-41. 
.. See id. at 443. The district court ordered the union to pay compensation in the form 
of back pay, losses from lapse of benefits, and allowances from the time of the discharge 
up to the date of decision, plus attorneys' fees and costs. 
.. See note 37 and accompanying text supra. 
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these considerations, Czosek clearly serves as the preferred stan-
dard in the majority of fair representation cases. The Czosek 
standard, however, does have its disadvantages. Most impor-
tantly, the Czosek standard leaves courts without a method to 
deter egregious union misconduct, especially in light of the Su-
preme Court's holding in IBEW v. Foust,r.1 forbidding awards of 
punitive damages in fair representation suits. Foust illustrates 
graphically the competing interests in damage apportionment, 
and merits extended discussion. In Foust, an employee sued his 
union for failing to file a grievance within the deadlines estab-
lished by the collective bargaining agreement. The jury awarded 
the employee both actual and punitive damages against the 
union. The Tenth Circuit held that punitive damages are appro-
priate where a union acts wantonly or in reckless disregard of an 
employee's rights, but remanded to determine whether the puni-
tive damage award was excessive. as On certiorari, the Supreme 
Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that punitive dam-
ages were never appropriate in fair representation suits. ae The 
Court, noting that the "actual damages caused by a union's fail-
ure to pursue grievances may be de minimis,"60 construed Vaca 
as setting limits on union liability.61 
According to the Foust majority, the Vaca apportionment 
scheme attempted to avoid burdening unions beyond the extent 
necessary to compensate employees for their injuries. H In some 
instances this rule does not deter unions from engaging in egre-
gious misconduct because they are liable for the legal fees in any 
event. The Court said, however, that deterrence provided an in-
sufficient reason to give juries unbridled discretion to award pu-
nitive damages, thereby endangering the financial stabiUty of 
unions.68 The minority concurred" on the inappropriateness of 
•• 442 U.S. 42 (1979). 
08 See id. at 45-46. 
" Id. at 52. The majority of five Justices voted to establish this per se rule, but the 
concurring minority of four Justices voted only to ban punitive damages in this and like 
cases not involving egregious conduct. 
90 Id. at 48. 
•• Id. at 49. 
11 The Court said: 
The Court in Vaca applied the compensation principle not only to gauge the 
sufficiency of relief but also to limit union liability. Because an employee can 
recover in full from his employer for its breach of contract, we reasoned that a 
union which fails to process a grievance predicated on that breach cannot be 
held liable for damages attributable to the employer's conduct. 
Id. at 49-50. 
11 Justice Marshall writing for the majority stated, "Inflicting this risk on employees, 
whose welfare depends upon the strengths of their union, is simply too great a price for 
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punitive damages in this case, but expressed concern about 
erecting a per se rule against punitive damages. 811 The concur-
ring Justices wrote that although punitive damages should be 
unavailable when unions breach the duty in good faith, such 
damages should be available when unions "notoriously 
misbehav[ e]. "88 
Although Foust primarily concerned punitive damages, the 
Court's opinion illustrates a major shortcoming of Czosek. The 
majority and concurring minority agree that the Czosek inter-
pretation of Vaca leads to the correct allocation of damages in 
the majority of cases. 87 The two groups differ over the proper 
way to handle egregious union misconduct. The majority, while 
conceding the undesirability of such conduct, shied away from 
remedying this problem with punitive damages because it feared 
giving juries the power to bankrupt locals.88 The concurring Jus-
tices feared that courts would not be able to deter wrongdoers 
without being given some tool to curb egregious union miscon-
duct.89 Foust, therefore, illustrates the problems with the cur-
rent state of the law on apportionment. The Czosek standard, 
clearly preferred by a majority of the Court, works well in most 
cases. Apportionment under Czosek, however, fails to deter egre-
gious union misconduct because malicious unions suffer no 
greater liability than merely negligent or careless unions. The 
inadequacy of the current standards explains the confusion 
whatever deterrent effect punitive damages may have." Id. at 51. 
.. Id. at 52 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
•• The concurring minority noted that: The Court now adopts a per se rule that a 
union's breach of its duty of fair representation can never render it liable for punitive 
damages, no matter how egregious its breach may be. Id. at 52 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) . 
.. Id. at 57 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
87 The majority wrote in reference to the Vaca scheme: 
Recognizing the "real hardship" that large damage awards could impose on un-
ions, the Court found "no merit in requiring [them] to pay the employer's share 
of the damages." To avoid burdening unions beyond the extent necessary to 
compensate employees for their injuries, we refused to create an exception even 
for those unions with indemnification rights against employers. Although ac-
knowledging that this apportionment rule might in some instances effectively 
immunize unions from liability for a clear breach of duty, the Court found con-
siderations of deterrence insufficient to risk endangering the financial stability of 
such institutions. 
Id. at 50 (citations omitted). The concurrence wrote: "As the court notes, the damages a 
union will be forced to pay in a typical unfair representation suit are minimal; under 
Vaca's apportionment formula, the bulk of the award will be paid by the employer, the 
perpetrator of the wrongful discharge, in a parallel§ 301 action." Id. at 57 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (citations omitted) . 
.. Id. at 50. 
•• Id. at 57 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
512 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 14:3 
among lower courts concerning how to apportion damages in fair 
representation suits. 70 
III. A PROPOSED ANALYSIS FOR FAIR REPRESENTATION CASES: 
SYNTHESIZING Czosek AND STEW ART 
The Court's bright line Czosek standard represents in most 
cases,' a workable accommodation of the competing policies at 
issue in fair representation suits. This standard fully compen-
sates employees71 while at the same time placing the damages on 
the actor that caused them.72 In light of the trend toward al-
lowing negligent conduct to breach the duty of fair representa-
tion, Czosek also relieves the fear that a relaxed standard will 
mean increased union liability.78 This apportionment standard 
should not be adopted without qualification, however, because it 
fails to provide courts with any method to deter union wrongdo-
ing - a serious shortcoming. The Supreme Court originally cre-
ated the duty of fair representation to prevent unions from 
70 A dramatic illustration of this confusion is supplied by Ruzicka v. General Motors 
Corp., 96 L.R.R.M. 2822 (E.D. Mich. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-1198 (6th Cir. May 
22, 1978). In this case an auto worker (Ruzicka) was discharged after reporting to work 
apparently intoxicated. Ruzicka immediately filed a grievance protesting company action 
and seeking reinstatement. After Ruzicka failed to gain redrees through his intra-union 
remedies he filed suit against G. M. for wrongful discharge and against the union for 
breach of the duty of fair representation. When the district court was finally presented 
with the issue of apportionment it was reluctant to accept either the employer's or the 
union's position. The union argued that the company should be liable for all the dam-
ages, including backpay and legal fees flowing from Ruzicka'e wrongful discharge. The 
company, citing Stewart's concurrence, argued that although Ruzicka's discharge was 
wrongful, the wrong would have been corrected years earlier by an arbitral award in 
plaintiff's favor had the union not breached its duty of fair representation in mishan-
dling his grievance for reimbursement. The company further argued that although the 
grievance proceeding was eventually ruled defective it should have been able to rely in 
the interim on the finality provisions of the grievance procedure. The court rejected both 
these arguments. Although the court recognized that both formulae were supported logi-
cally and in the case law it fashioned its own remedy. Stating that it considered the 
combined action of the parties as the source of Ruzicka's continuing wrong, the court 
divided the damages in half. 96 L.R.R.M. at 2837. 
71 See note 62 and accompanying text supra. 
71 See notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra. 
71 See Vladeck, The Conff,ict between the Duty of Fair Representation and the Limi-
tations on Union Self-Government, in THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION 44, 46 (J. 
McKelvey ed. 1977): 
My primary concern is that while the courts are imposing what appear to be 
higher and higher standards for the performance of this duty, they do not ap-
pear to understand upon whom they are imposing such obligations .... We 
should not forget that unions are governed and administered by nonlawyers, 
working people who come from the shops. 
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abusing their exclusive power; such conduct should not go un-
punished. 74 Consequently, when union conduct is so egregious711 
that it would support independent liability, additional damages 
are warranted. 78 
When considered separately, both Justice Stewart's approach 
and the Czosek apportionment method fail to handle the full 
range of fair representation situations adequately. Justice Stew-
art's approach seems overly concerned with being equitable to 
the employer - the party whose breach precipitated the union's 
breach. 77 This standard could place exorbitant damages on the 
union for merely negligent conduct, an unacceptable result.78 
Likewise, the Czosek analysis, which focuses on causation, will 
never place more than nominiµ damages on the union. In the 
contract administration setting the employee's damage has its 
roots in the employer's breach of contract.79 Consequently, it can 
rarely be said "but for" the union's breach the employee would 
not have been damaged. 
Stewart's analysis, nevertheless, seems especially valuable as a 
device to deter egregious union conduct without permitting ju-
ries to impose unlimited punitive damages. Significantly, Stew-
art's apportionment approach in the cases of egregious conduct 
solves the dilemma the Court ·faced in ]BEW u. Foust.80 Both 
the majority and concurrence in Foust recognized that union 
misconduct should be deterred;81 they merely disagreed on 
whether punitive damages provided the vehicle for curbing such 
conduct. Stewart's standard answers the majority's concern 
about giving juries unchecked power to wreak havoc on union 
treasuriesH because damages will be limited by the employee's 
" Unless the Court provides a method of deterring notorious union wrongdoing, courts 
may seek ways of distinguishing Foust and assess punitive damages anyway. See Ander-
son v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 484 F. Supp. 76 (D. Minn. 1980). In Anderson, 
the court held that Foust did not create a per se rule against punitive damages, but 
merely a rule which forbade punitive damages where the union had only been negligent. 
The court in this case found an intentional misrepresentation by the union to the em-
ployees and asssessed punitive damages. 
•• Justice Blackmun, writing for the concurring minority in Foust, listed as examples 
of the type of conduct which can be characterized as egregious: "intentional racial dis-
crimination, deliberate personal animus, or conscious infringment of speech and associa-
tional freedoms .... " 442 U.S. at 60. While this list is by no means exhaustive, it is 
indicative of the type of conduct being referred to. 
•• See Linsey, supra note 15, at 678-79. 
•• See notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra. 
71 See note 55 and accompanying text supra. 
•• See Summers, supra note 14, at 254-63. 
80 442 U.S. 42 (1979). See notes 68-69 and accompanying text supra. 
11 See notes 66-69 and accompanying text supra. 
" See note 68 and accompanying text supra. 
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actual losses. It also answers the concurring Justices' concern 
about leaving · courts without the tools to curb egregious union 
misconduct. 88 The threat of being assessed a large portion of 
compensatory damages, which follows from Stewart's standard, 
would deter those unions inclined to discriminate or engage in 
other wrongful conduct. 
A. A Two-Tiered Analysis for Fair Representation Suits 
This article recommends that ·courts adopt a two-tiered analy-
sis for fair representation cases. Under the first tier of the analy-
sis, a court in general would presume that the Czosek standard 
applies. The employer, then, would be responsible for all 
damages flowing from his breach of contract - i.e., wages, lost 
benefits, and fringes. Similarly, the union would be liable for all 
damages resulting from its failure to fairly represent the em-
ployee - i.e., attorney fees and court costs. Under the second 
tier of the analysis, however, a court uncovering evidence of 
"egregious union misconduct" would apply Stewart's standard 
rather than Czosek when apportioning damages." Accordingly, 
the union would be liable for damages which accrued after its 
misconduct, including both back pay and litigation costs. This 
two-tiered analysis synthesizes the best elements of the Czosek 
and Stewart standards. 
A critical problem for this analysis is in defining "egregious 
union misconduct". A court following the guidelines discussed 
here would undertake in every fair representation suit a factual 
investigation of the union's conduct. Obviously, no bright line 
can be drawn between "egregious" and other union behavior. 
Certain broad categories of activities, nevertheless, can be sin-
gled out as examples of egregious union misconduct. Intentional 
discrimination of any type, deliberate personal animus, or a con-
scious infringement of speech or associational freedoms, for ex-
ample, could serve as starting-point characterizations of egre-
gious union misconduct.86 If a court found any one of these 
types of behavior when measuring the union's behavior, then the 
n See note 69 and accompanying text supra. 
.. Since the presumption favors the Czosek apportionment standard, it would be in 
the employer's best interest to bring forth evidence of union misconduct because it 
would be relieved of a large portion of damages. H due to a statute of limitations or other 
procedural problem the employer cannot be joined in the suit, it would be in the em-
ployee's best interest to bring forth evidence of union animus to receive full 
compensation. 
u See note 75 and accompanying text supra. 
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second tier of the analysis would govern damage apportionment. 
Courts, of course, would refine the concept of egregious miscon-
duct on a case-by-case basis. · 
B. Applying the Two-Tiered Analysis 
A hypothetical example, based upon Ruzicka v. General Mo-
tors Corp.,88 illustrates how this article's two-tiered analysis fa-
cilitates equitable apportionment of damages in fair representa-
tion suits. In Ruzicka, the supervisor encountered the plaintiff, 
an autoworker, in an apparently drunken state. Rather than fol-
lowing shop .custom by sending him home for the balance of the 
shift, the fore man took Ruzicka to the company's labor relations 
office for a disciplinary interview.87 During the wait, Ruzicka 
made a number of threats to the supervisor. The company dis-
charged Ruzicka immediately after the interview, even though 
the arbitrator later found that at most a thirty-day suspension 
without pay was justified.88 Ruzicka thereafter filed a grievance 
seeking reinstatement. The union, however, allegedly failed to 
meet the deadlines mandated by the contract for grievance 
processing, and GM refused to consider the grievance further.89 
How should the damages be apportioned in a hypothetical suit 
brought by Ruzicka against both the employer and the union? A 
court employing the two-tiered analysis would first determine 
the reasons why the union failed to process the grievance. If the 
union's failure amounted to merely negligent conduct, then the 
first tier of the analysis dictates that the Czosek standard apply. 
A court determining that the union's failure constituted egre-
gious misconduct, on the other hand, would be compelled under 
the second tier of this analysis to apply Stewart's Hines 
standard. 
In the hypothetical above, where the court characterizes the 
union's breach as negligent80 rather than as egregious81 miscon-
duct, the equities clearly favor assessing the employer with the 
bulk of the damages - a result achieved through the use of the 
Czosek standard. The employer breached the contract by dis-
charging Ruzicka for an infraction that only warranted a suspen-
.. 96 L.R.R.M. 2822 (E.D. Mich. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-1198 (6th Cir. May 
22, 1978) . 
.., Id. at 2825. 
18 Id. at 2828. 
• Id. at 2825. 
00 See note 14 and accompanying text supra. 
01 See note 75 and accompanying text. supra. 
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sion penalty. At all times thereafter, the employer alone held the 
power to reinstate Ruzicka and award him backpay. Yet, the 
company refused to take such an action. In contrast, the union 
though negligent, acted in good faith. Although they missed a 
grievance filing deadline, they still attempted to process the 
complaint. Under Czosek, the union would only be assessed legal 
fees and court costs, clearly a more equitable result in this situa-
tion. Consequently, a court examining this hypothetical fair rep-
resentation suit would utilize only the first tier of the suggested 
apportionment. 
A . change in the hypothetical's facts demonstrates how the 
second tier of the analysis operates. If the court discovers, for 
example, that the local failed to meet the filing deadline because 
the union hierarchy disliked employee Ruzicka, then Stewart's 
standard should be applied.92 Under these facts, the union 
breached its duty through conscious discrimination - egregious 
conduct under any definition. If the union had processed the 
grievance, an arbitrator probably would have found the company 
in breach of contract, and reinstated Ruzicka with backpay.98 In 
this situation, the equities side with the employer. Although the 
employer initially breached the contract, the union willfully un-
dermined the grievance procedure which could have resolved the 
entire dispute. 
The Supreme Court developed the duty of fair representation 
to curb this type of discriminatory union conduct.94 Placing the 
bulk of damages on the union to deter egregious misconduct, 
therefore, is logically sound. The second tier of the proposed 
analysis, which accomplishes this task, should by applied when-
ever the court uncovers evidence of gross union misconduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the law of apportionment is still in a confused state, 
the present Supreme Court seems to view the Czosek standard 
as the correct method of apportioning damages. Justice Stew-
art's standard outlined in Hines, however, presents an attractive 
" In Ruzicka, the plaintiff had attempted to show that his grievance was not 
processed because of the hatred his union steward had for him. He was, however, unable 
to demonstrate conclusively that the steward's personal animus was the proximate cause 
of the failure to meet the deadline. See 96 L.R.R.M: at 2826. 
'" In every other similar situation the most severe penalty imposed for firat• time on-
the-job intoxication was a disciplinary layoff. Id. at 2828. 
" See note 2 and accompanying text supra. 
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method for overcoming the problem that the Court created by 
banning punitive damages in fair representation suits. His stan-
dard provides courts with a way to curb union wrongdoing with-
out endangering the financial strength of unions if juries were 
granted the power to award massive punitive damages. This arti~ 
cle's synthesis of the Czosek and Stewart standards preserves 
the goal of promoting industrial peace through collective bar-
gaining, without the jeopardy to individual rights which results 
if union misconduct is allowed to go unchecked. 
-Kenneth B. McClain 

